Abstract-RFID technology is one of the most pervasive computing technologies with important advantages and a wide range of applications. Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of RFID technology mainly depends on fixing the security and privacy concerns of this technology. Using a tagged object should not lead to the traceability of this object. This concern is a challenging issue that has motivated the proposal of several authentication protocols that attempted to fix the traceability problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a prominent technology for automated identification with various applications, e.g., supply chain management, e-passports, human implants and toll payment. RFID systems consist of RFID tags, RFID readers and a back-end database.
‚ The RFID tags are connected or embedded to the objects that are supposed to be identified by the RFID reader. ‚ The RFID reader reads though radio frequency signals the RFID tags and may also able to modify the tags' information. ‚ The back-end database provides extra storage space where additional information about the tagged objects may be stored. Obviously, it is much more reliable to keep the valuable data of all tags in back-end database and transfer only the necessary data of a particular tag, in case of request, to the reader. Low cost RFID tags are increasingly being deployed in various applications. Nevertheless, high security and privacy concerns are raised depending on the application. Traceability of RFID tags is an important issue that should be avoided in order not to violate the privacy rights of the parties carrying or using the tagged objects.
As a result of the increased deployment of RFID tags, a broad range of RFID authentication protocols have been proposed. Among them, recently Morshed et al. in [2] have proposed three protocols, called SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 based on an approach which uses two very different but widely known approaches to design an RFID protocol, i.e. the "lowcost authentication protocol (LCAP)" [3] approach and the "one-way hash-based LCAP (OHLCAP)" [1] approach, and claimed that their protocols are more secure than other existing schemes. However, in this work we investigate the security of the SUAP protocols and show that these protocols are vulnerable to traceability. We describe a traceability attack which can be deployed against all three variants of the SUAP protocol. The proposed attack on these protocols is highly efficient, has success probability almost equal to 1 and can be performed on the cost of 16 runs of the learning phase of the protocol and only one run of the on-line phase of the protocol.
Paper Organization: In section II we give a brief description of the SUAP protocols (i.e. SUAP 1, SUAP 2 and SUAP 3). In Section III we explain the proposed traceability attack against the three variants of the SUAP protocols. Finally, section IV concludes the paper.
II. PROTOCOLS DESCRIPTION

A. SUAP1
Based on SUAP1 designers' claims, this protocol can be used in an RFID system where a small number of RFID tags is employed. In this protocol, a common secret x and the tag's identifier ID are stored in the tag and the back-end database keeps the tag's identifier ID, the common secret number x and the hash address Had " hpIDq for each tag. The protocol SUAP1 (depicted in Fig. 1 ) can be summarised as follows:
1) The reader generates a random number r 1 and sends it to the tag. 2) After receiving r 1 , the tag generates another random number r 2 . If r 1 or r 2 equals 0, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the tag does as follows: 
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‚ it sends y, t and the left half of the computed hash value, i.e. h L , to the reader. 3) The reader then sends y, t, h L and r 1 to the back-end database. 4) After receiving the values y, t, h L and r 1 , the back-end database: ‚ retrieves r 2 as t ' x.
‚ retrieves Had, i.e. hpIDq, as y´pr 1 ' r 2 q where Had is the address of the record containing the ID. ‚ retrieves ID from the record. ‚ computes hpID}r 1 }r 2 q. ‚ compares the left half of the computed value of hpID}r 1 }r 2 q by the received value of h L . If they are the same, it authenticates the tag and sends h R to the reader where h R is the right half of hpID}r 1 }r 2 q. 5) The reader forwards h R to the tag. 6) Upon receiving h R , the tag compares the received value with the computed value. If they match, the tag authen- The length of an identifier which is assumed to be 96 bits r 1 and r 2 Random numbers with length l bits
Sending a message from A to B pXq i i th -bit of string X, where the least significant bit (LSB) of X is denoted by pXq 0 t0u x A string of zeros of length x-bits X| b"a A fraction of string X includes bit b to bit a, where a°b.
The value of string X at the i th run of protocol. for an RFID system with a small number of tags. We should make clear that it is an important concern to have only a single secret x for all the tags in a large organization and this protocol should be avoided in such applications.
B. SUAP2
To overcome the problem of SUAP1, Morshed et al. have proposed SUAP2 which is suitable for a large number of tags. In this protocol it is assumed that the back-end database divides the tags to n groups and stores the tag's identifier ID, the secret number x of a group of tags and one extra variable GID which denotes a group identifier GID. The values x, ID and GID are also stored on each tag. The back-end database also keeps the value Had " hpIDq as an address of the record containing the tag's ID. The steps of the SUAP2 (depicted in Fig. 2 ) are as follows:
1) The reader generates a random number r 1 and sends it to the tag. 2) After receiving r 1 , the tag generates another random number r 2 . If r 1 or r 2 equals 0, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the tag: ‚ computes y " hpIDq`pr 1 ' r 2 ' GIDq, t " r 2 ' x and hpID}r 1 }r 2 }GIDq. ‚ sends y, t and the left half of the computed hash value, i.e. h L , to the reader. 3) The reader then sends y, t, h L and r 1 to the back-end database. 4) After receiving these values, the back-end database:
‚ retrieves r 2 as t ' x. ‚ retrieves Had, i.e. hpIDq, as y´pr 1 'r 2 'GIDq where Had is the address of the record containing ID. ‚ looks up the address Had. ‚ retrieves ID from the record. ‚ computes hpID}r 1 }r 2 }GIDq. ‚ compares the left half of the computed value of hpID}r 1 }r 2 }GIDq by the received value of h L . If they are the same, it authenticates the tag and sends h R to the reader where h R is the right half of hpID}r 1 }r 2 }GIDq.
5) The reader forwards h
R to the tag. 6) After receiving h R , the tag compares the received h R with the computed value. If they match, the tag authenticates the reader.
C. SUAP3
For enhancing the SUAP2 efficiency, Morshed et al. have proposed SUAP3 in which the only difference compared to SUAP2 is that SUAP3 does not use the secret key x shared between the tag and the database. SUAP3, which is depicted in Fig. 3 , is summarized below:
1) The reader generates a random number r 1 and sends it to the tag. 2) After receiving r 1 , the tag generates another random number r 2 . If r 1 or r 2 equals 0, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the tag: 
III. TRACEABILITY ATTACK
Morshed et al. have claimed that the use of two random numbers make the transferred messages unpredictable and thus, the protocol is not vulnerable to a tracing attack. However, in this section we present an efficient traceability attack against all versions of the SUAP protocols. The proposed attack is based on the following observations: 1) Assume that: A " pAq l´1 } . . . }pAq 1 }pAq 0 , V " pV q l´1 } . . . }pV q 1 }pV q 0 and W " pW q l´1 } . . . }pW q 1 }pW q 0 are strings each of l-bits where pV q i denotes the i th bit of V . a) Assume that X " A`V and
Given the above observation, to trace the target tag T i in the protocols SUAP1, SUAP2 or SUAP3, the adversary A performs the following steps: Phase 1 (Learning) ‚ if there exists a pair pppy j , t j q P T abq, ppy f , t f q P T ab
. The total complexity of the given attack is N sessions, required for the learning phase, plus N 1 sessions, required for the execution phase. The adversary's advantage Adv A to make the correct decision in the third phase of the attack is defined as follows:
o determine Adv A one can do as follows: 1) For any entry t j in T ab 1 , for 1 § j § N 1 and for any 1 § k § l, we denote the number of entries in T ab such that
Following the given observation, if t j | 0"pkq " t f | 0"pkq and T i " T 1 i then the adversary can conclude that pr j 2 q| 0"pk´1q " pr f 2 q| 0"pk´1q . On the other hand, for any version of the SUAP protocols and for the selected value as r 1 , one can state that y j " X`r 2 , where X depends on the used version of the SUAP protocol but is static for a given tag in a given version of the protocol. So, if r j 2 | 0"pkq " r f 2 | 0"pkq the adversary verifies whether y j | 0"pk´1q " y f | 0"pk´1q ; which is satisfied for
with the probability equal to 1 and for T i ‰ T 1 i with the probability equal to 2´k. 4) Hence, recall that M j k " N 2 k`1 , the probability that T i ‰ T 1 i but the adversary outputs "1"(wrong alarm), P r wrong , is determined as follows:
5) The adversary's advantage to trace the target tag successfully is given by:
Following the given procedure the adversary's advantage to distinguish the given tag from the target tag is non-negligible. As an example, for N " 16 (which can be considered as the off-line phase of the attack) and N 1 " 1 (which can be considered as the on-line phase of the attack) and doing some numerical calculation we have Adv A • 1´2´1 4 . Hence, even for the on-line complexity of only one run of the protocol, the success probability of the given attack is almost equal to 1. For N " N 1 " 16 we have Adv A • 1´p2´1 4 q 16 " 1´2´2 24 which is almost equal to 1. An interesting point of this attack is that it works for all three protocols SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 and even the adversary does not require to know which protocol the target tag is using.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that the recently proposed RFID authentication protocols by Morshed et al. fail to provide adequate security against traceability attacks. In this paper we presented an attack which can trace an RFID tag whenever it uses any of the protocols proposed by Morshed et al., i.e. SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3. We also show that the success probability of the attack is very high. In general terms SUAP family of protocols overuses the XOR operation, and this weak property should be avoided in cryptography.
